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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The first of the issues raised in appellant Jerry Mason's 
("Mason") appeal -- whether a state court's inordinate delay 
of four years in processing a petition for collateral relief 
under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. SS 9541 et seq. ("PCRA") constitutes a due 
process violation cognizable in a federal habeas corpus 
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 22541 - has already 
been addressed and resolved by this court. See Hassine v. 
Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
delay in processing a collateral proceeding is not cognizable 
in federal habeas corpus, even if the delay amounts to a 
constitutional violation); Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 
The second issue raised in Mason's appeal is whether the 
District Court should have permitted Mason to amend his 
S 2254 petition to include a second claim because the two- 
strike provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. S 2244, effectively 
precludes petitioners from filing a second or subsequent 
habeas petition except in the most unusual of 
circumstances. We hold that Mason is entitled to the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 28 U.S.C. S 2254 provides, in relevant part, that the court: "shall 
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 
of the United States." 
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prophylactic warnings we recently mandated in United 
States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999)-- that the 
District Court must advise Mason, as a pro se  petitioner, of 
the AEDPA implications before ruling on Mason's petition. 
Because the District Court did not have the benefit of our 
recent instructions, we will vacate the District Court's 
orders and remand so that the District Court may comply 




Mason was convicted of various crimes in 1988, in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.3 
In 1989, Mason was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
of between fourteen and twenty-eight years and restitution. 
Mason appealed his conviction and sentence to the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On August 27, 1990, the 
Superior Court affirmed his conviction and sentence but 
vacated the restitution order. 
 On March 24, 1992, Mason filed a petition under the 
PCRA alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The 
court appointed counsel to represent him, and an 
evidentiary hearing was held on August 11, 1993. Not 
hearing anything further from either the court or his 
counsel for four years, on August 12, 1997, Masonfiled a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254, alleging that a four year 
delay in resolving his PCRA petition violated his right to 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
The District Court assigned the case to a magistrate 
judge who filed a report and recommendation on October 
22, 1997, holding that Mason was excused from having to 
first exhaust state remedies.4See Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As we discuss in text infra, we will apply the Miller requirements to 
S 2254 habeas petitions as well as to S 2255 habeas petitions. 
3. Mason was convicted of kidnapping, rape, two counts of involuntary 
deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, terroristic threats and 
unlawful restraint. 
 
4. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b) provides in part that a writ of habeas corpus 
should not be granted "unless it appears that the applicant has 
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F.2d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that inordinate delay 
can excuse exhaustion requirement). The magistrate judge 
then distinguished between inordinate delays in state court 
proceedings on direct rather than on collateral appeal by 
relying on decisions from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.5 
The magistrate judge determined that "delay by the PCRA 
court in deciding the petitioner's PCRA petition[collateral 
review] does not amount to a due process violation even if 
the delay is inordinate. . . ." Appendix at Exhibit A. 
 
Mason filed his objections to this report and 
recommendation on November 3, 1997. The government 
neither objected to the magistrate judge's recommendation 
with respect to the exhaustion claim, nor responded to 
Mason's objections. The District Court adopted the 
magistrate judge's report and recommendation on 
December 16, 1997, dismissed the federal habeas petition, 
and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. In a 
motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1998, Mason 
requested leave to amend his habeas petition to include his 
underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
The District Court denied the motion on January 13, 1998, 
simply stating that "[t]his he cannot do." We granted 
Mason's application for a certificate of appealability and 
Mason timely filed a notice of appeal.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." For 
purposes of this appeal, however, it is important to note that S 2254(b) 
provides an exception to the exhaustion requirement if: "there is an 
absence of available State corrective process; [or] circumstances exist 
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 
applicant." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(c) states that an "applicant shall not be 
deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 
State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the 
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question 
presented." 
 
5. See Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996); Franzen 
v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 
6. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 2254 and 1331; we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 





Mason claims that he was denied a federal due process 
right with respect to the delay involved in processing his 
petition for post-conviction relief. Even if such a delay 
constitutes a due process violation, Mason's claim must 
fail. This Court has rejected the proposition that in a case 
with a factual setting such as Mason presents, a delay in a 
collateral proceeding can be the basis of a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 




Although the subject of Mason's motion -- styled as a 
Motion for Reconsideration -- was Mason's attempt to 
amend his S 2254 petition to add another claim, the District 
Court, without regard to the context, treated the motion as 
one for reconsideration and stated without more,"[t]his he 
cannot do." In light of the fact that United States v. Miller, 
197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999), was not decided until after the 
District Court had rendered its decision denying Mason's 
Motion for Reconsideration, and because our decision today 
requires compliance with Miller in S 2254 as well as S 2255 
petitions, we have no need to address the District Court's 
basis or reason for denying Mason's Motion for 
Reconsideration. We discuss the Miller requirements infra. 
 
The AEDPA provides that a second or successive habeas 
petition under S 2254 is to be dismissed unless certain very 
specific and rare circumstances exist. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244. 
None of those exceptions applies in Mason's case. As a 
result of the AEDPA's two-strike rule, it is essential that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Mason also briefly suggests that the PCRA engendered in him a liberty 
interest violated by the state's inordinate delay. He analogizes the PCRA 
to Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987), in which the Supreme 
Court held that a state statute mandating the parole of an inmate after 
the parole board's findings of specific facts engendered a liberty 
interest 
 
in the inmates. This argument, however, does not assist Mason in his 
current claim as, even if the PCRA engenders a liberty interest -- an 
issue not addressed herein -- the relief sought in Allen was pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 and not pursuant to a federal habeas proceeding. See 
id. 
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habeas petitioners include in their first petition all potential 
claims for which they might desire to seek review and relief. 
Mason's August 12, 1997, pro se habeas petition included 
only a claim of inordinate delay in processing his PCRA 
petition, but failed to include his additional claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because of the 
AEDPA's two strike rule, when the District Court dismissed 
Mason's habeas petition, Mason was consequently barred 
from bringing a second habeas petition to address his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. It is understandable, 
therefore, that Mason sought to amend his petition by 
means of his Motion for Reconsideration, although he did 
so improperly. 
 
In Miller, we recounted how the AEDPA had"dramatically 
altered the form and timing of habeas petitions in the 
federal courts" and observed that petitioners"must marshal 
in one S 2255 writ all the arguments they have to 
collaterally attack their convictions." Miller, 197 F.3d at 649.8 
We stressed that out of a sense of fairness, a district court 
should not prevent a pro se petitioner from presenting all of 
his claims in one full-fledged S 2255 attack upon his 
conviction. Accordingly, we have now required that under 
Miller, district courts provide certain prophylactic "notice" 
measures before either re-characterizing a post conviction 
motion as a S 2255 motion or ruling on a S 2255 motion 
denominated as such when the petitioner is proceeding pro 
se. See id. The Miller rule requires that the district court 
advise the pro se petitioner that he can: 
 
       (1) have his motion ruled upon as filed; (2) if his 
       motion is not styled as a S 2255 motion have his 
       motion recharacterized as a S 2255 motion and heard 
       as such, but lose his ability to file successive petitions 
       absent certification by the court of appeals; or (3) 
       withdraw the motion, and file one all inclusiveS 2255 
       petition within the one-year statutory period. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Miller's prophylactic rule extended the Second Circuit's holding in 
Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 1998), which required 
that before a court could re-characterize a petitioner's motion as a 
S 2255 motion (thereby subjecting it to the restrictions of the AEDPA), 
the court must first apprise the petitioner of the AEDPA consequences of 
such a re-characterization. 
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Id. at 652. 
 
Although Miller involved a S 2255 petition, in footnote 7 of 
that opinion we suggested that similar prophylactic steps 
might also be warranted under S 2254 because the AEDPA 
similarly restricts the filing of a second or successive S 2254 
habeas petition. See id. at 652 n.7.9 Because there is no 
meaningful way to distinguish between S 2254 and S 2255 
with respect to the restrictions imposed by the AEDPA and 
the fairness policy we have expressed in instituting this 
supervisory rule, we will now apply Miller's instructions and 
requirements to S 2254 habeas petitions made by pro se 
petitioners -- whether styled as S 2254 petitions or 
recharacterized as such. Had Mason been given the notice 
that Miller requires, he would have been informed of the 
need to add his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to 




With Heiser and Hassine as precedential background, we 
would normally affirm the District Court's dismissal of 
Mason's habeas claim. However, if we were to follow that 
course in this proceeding, we would negate the principle 
established in Miller. 
 
As we pointed out in section III, supra, the District Court 
did not have the benefit of the Miller instruction when it 
denied relief to Mason's motion for reconsideration-- a 
motion designed to amend Mason's original S 2254 petition. 
Had Mason been afforded the opportunity to add to his 
original S 2254 petition a claim for ineffective assistance of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In fact, with respect to the AEDPA, "[i]n order to provide guidance to 
the district courts, and hence facilitate the orderly administration of 
justice in these cases, we have followed the practice, whenever we decide 
an AEDPA issue that arises under S 2254 and the same holding would 
analytically be required in a case arising underS 2255, or vice versa, of 
so informing the district courts." Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of 
Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Burns v. Morton, 
134 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1998); Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 
752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996)). See also Swartz v. Meyers, No. 98-7282, 2000 
WL 22581, at *3 n.4 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2000); Kapral v. United States, 166 
F.3d 565, 574 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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counsel, the District Court would have had before it both a 
collateral claim -- which it could not entertain-- and a 
direct claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-- which it 
would have been obliged to address. See, e.g. Heiser v. 
Ryan, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1994). To give effect to the Miller 
doctrine, we must, therefore, permit Mason on appropriate 
notice to select among the Miller options-- which we will 
require the District Court to provide.10 
 
In doing so, it will be necessary to vacate the District 
Court's holding as to Mason's "delay" issue. We do so, 
however, not to affect the holdings of either Heiser or 
Hassine -- which are the law of this Circuit-- but rather 
exclusively because Mason, as a pro se petitioner, was not 
given the required Miller instructions. By vacating this 
dismissal, we will be providing Mason with a clean slate so 
that Mason may, if he so desires, bring one all-inclusive 
S 2254 habeas petition alleging all of his claims. We note 
that if Mason were to once again assert in his S 2254 
petition a claim of inordinate delay in processing his PCRA 
petition, the District Court will be obliged under Heiser and 




In order to achieve the objective sought by our 
instruction in United States v. Miller, we will accordingly 
vacate the District Court's orders which dismissed Mason's 
S 2254 petition and denied his motion for reconsideration, 
and we will direct the district court to provide Mason with 
the notice and the instructions found in Miller . 
 
We can anticipate that the District Court, in following 
this direction may have to consider the statute of 
limitations constrictions found in the AEDPA. Therefore, we 
call particular attention to Miller's holding, which we adopt 
with respect to S 2254, that if in the future a district court 
failed to provide the necessary warnings prescribed in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In allowing Mason to select among his Miller options, we have no 
need to address the issue of retroactivity with respect to all S 2254 
petitions. Rather, as this case decides Miller  applicability to S 2254 
petitions, it is appropriate for us to apply our Miller holding to Mason. 
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Miller, the statute of limitations should similarly be tolled to 
allow the petitioner an opportunity to file all of his claims 
in the correct manner. See Miller, 197 F.3d at 653.11 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Miller allows the S 2255 petitioner 120 days to re-file his habeas 
petition. See Miller, 197 F.3d at 653. In view of our instant decision, 
S 2254 petitioners should receive the same 120 days in which to re-file 
their petitions. 
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